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An exuberant proliferation of media 
outlets is emerging in areas contro-
lled by Libya’s rebels. The ability to 
talk openly, publish, and broadcast 
without fear is an unprecedented free-
dom for a society repressed and hea-
vily censored for decades, and one 
that is being seized with energy and 
enthusiasm. This is a monumental —
indeed revolutionary— shift in Libyan 
politics and society, and is one of the 
key channels for the extraordinary le-
vel of energy released by the uprising. 
New initiatives include print and sate-
llite TV; terrestrial TV and radio; mul-
tiple online collaborations; as well as 
cartoons, music, graffiti, theatre, and 
other forms. Free speech and free me-
dia are central rebel demands, which 
makes these new media efforts core to 
the uprising’s very image and identity, 
key to its mobilisation, and an early 
embodiment of some of the its main 
goals. A free rights-based media that 
is able to make positive contributions 
to the transition needs an increase in 
skills, an appropriate clear institutio-
nal and regulatory frameworks, and a 
public debate about just what Libya’s 
free media should and could look like. 
Una incessant proliferació de mitjans de 
comunicació està emergent en àrees sota 
control dels rebels libis. La capacitat de 
parlar obertament, i de publicar i trans-
metre sense cap tipus de por, significa una 
llibertat desconeguda per a una societat 
reprimida i durament censurada durant 
dècades i que ara avança amb energia 
i entusiasme. Això representa un canvi 
extraordinari —autènticament revolucio-
nari— en la política i la societat líbies i 
és un dels canals clau per l’extraordinari 
nivell d’energia alliberat per la revolta. 
Noves iniciatives inclouen publicacions, 
televisió per satèl·lit, televisió i ràdio ter-
restres, múltiples col·laboracions online, 
així com tires còmiques, graffitti, teatre 
i altres formes de comunicació. Llibertat 
d’expressió i mitjans de comunicació 
lliures són reivindicacions centrals dels 
rebels, cosa que fa d’aquests mitjans re-
novats el nucli de la imatge i la identitat 
de la revolta, peça clau per a la mobilit-
zació i jove representació dels seus objec-
tius principals. Perquè uns mitjans basats 
en el dret a la llibertat puguin contribuir 
positivament a les necessitats de la tran-
sició, cal un increment de recursos, un 
marc institucional regulador i un debat 
públic sobre com haurien i podrien ser a 
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The demand for freedom of speech and free media is universally stated in heart-felt terms at all levels of the uprising. The revolution has opened up space for media freedom that has never been experienced in Libya before. The energy 
and enthusiasm present in the emerging media sector is impressive and positive.
Yet one issue that needs consideration is the current imperative for media to 
adhere to or share the explicit identity of the overall revolution itself. While the 
uprising has an extraordinary level of popular participation and is mobilised by 
demands for a range of human rights, on the ground any revolution is first and fo-
remost a political and military objective. Yet, perhaps almost inevitably, ideas of free 
speech and free media were frequently conflated by several interviewees with sup-
port for the revolution’s political and military objectives. The revolution may sup-
port a rights-based media system, but it is not the same thing as such a system. This 
distinction may not be crucial now, but if a clear debate on Libya’s media is to take 
place and frame its future development, it is a distinction that needs to be made. 
Beyond free speech and free media issues themselves, demands for other civil 
and political rights are also high. Yet the issues and obligations contained within a 
While current expressions of agreement 
for rights-based media are strong, such 
a debate is still essential for future de-
velopment —such media never simply 
emerge ‘automatically’. The higher the 
quality of the debate, the broader the 
discussion, the more effective the trai-
ning and technical support, the better 
Libya’s media will become— with cru-
cial implications for the country’s politi-
cal, social, and economic development. 
Libya has many challenges in its future; 
with the right support, new media out-
lets will be able to make the strongest 
contribution possible to the transition’s 
political stability, its democracy, and 
its social cohesion. But preparation for 
these challenges needs to begin now. 
Key words: Arab Spring, democratic 
transition, media reform.
Líbia aquests mitjans lliures. Mentre les 
mostres de suport a uns mitjans amb tots 
els drets són prou fortes, cal un debat so-
bre el seu desenvolupament, ja que no 
poden emergir “automàticament”. Com 
més alta sigui la qualitat del debat, més 
àmplia la discussió i més efectiu tot el 
suport tècnic, millors seran els mitjans 
a Líbia —amb clares repercussions en el 
desenvolupament polític, social i econò-
mic del país—. Líbia té molts reptes de 
futur; amb el suport necessari, els mitjans 
de comunicació seran capaços de contri-
buir amb força a l’estabilitat política de 
la transició, a la democràcia i a la cohe-
sió social. Amb tot, la preparació per fer 
front a aquests reptes cal que comenci 
des d’ara.
Paraules clau: Primavera Àrab, transi-
ció democràtica, reforma dels mitjans.
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system of rights are only now being explored: Gaddafi-era repression means civil so-
ciety is a new concept, and many of these questions simply couldn’t become part of 
public debate in previous years. The will is there —but a developed understanding 
of the differences between humanitarian principles, human rights, and political 
objectives is not well developed and may hold potential pitfalls for the future—.  
This means the possibility for misinterpretation and misunderstandings on 
rights generally also needs to be acknowledged in discussing the role of emerging 
media. Libya’s new media outlets represent an opportunity and asset that can 
play a great role in developing public understanding of these issues. Conversely, 
if media outlets themselves are not clear on the issues and distinctions involved, 
they will almost inevitably spread misunderstandings that can only complicate 
the political process, including human rights and humanitarian objectives. 
Members of the transitional administration at all levels have expressed great 
commitment to free media and free speech, and in several cases taken early ini-
tiatives to ensure its development. But there is some jockeying for influence or 
resources in the media, and some political topics that are considered taboo and 
stated as such by figures in authority (see ‘Note on Censorship’, below). Political 
positions are still emerging; many potential difficulties can be generated simply 
by lack of skills, experience, and / or strong institutions, and a lack of general 
familiarity with relevant debates on the roles free media is obliged to take.  
These observations shouldn’t be interpreted as broad generalisations across 
the whole emerging media sector. It is true that several national leaders and 
media practitioners are clear about the distinction between supporting the re-
volution itself, and supporting free rights-based media. Nevertheless, there are 
others for whom the distinction is less clear. The current atmosphere does not 
yet exhibit a tension between free-speech principles and revolutionary goals, and 
there are many examples of initiatives that aim to use the new space to promote 
positive social change. But to repeat, commitment to the political cause of over-
throwing Gaddafi’s regime, and commitment to a rightsbased framework of free 
speech and free media, are not necessarily the same, even though there is great 
overlap between them at this point in time. 
As the situation becomes more complex, the media’s role will become more 
challenging. Support in this context is crucial; however in such a fluid situation, 
it is impossible to predict which outlets will continue and develop and which 
will fold; or what different editorial stances or possible political positions they 
will take. It is also difficult to predict what the final regulatory and political en-
vironment will look like. 
This means media support needs to be targeted but flexible, meeting current 
needs but without becoming locked into a limited number of relationships or as-
suming events will take one particular course. Media support activities, including 
training, provision of equipment, facilitation of international links, and support for 
debate on the media’s roles, must aim to meet several immediate and short-term 
goals, but also to facilitate broad relationships and input that allow Libyan media 
practitioners to engage in their own discussions and set their own future directions. 
In this context it is worthwhile noting that at a Round-Table meeting organi-
zed by the UN2 in Cairo in June 6 the UN stressed “the key role that local media 
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60 and other communication channels —civil society, religious community leaders— 
could play in creating crucial links with local communities”.3 The participants, 
including Internews, also agreed that efforts to engage civil society organizations 
and other stakeholders in the early recovery activities should be maintained. 
In any of the potential scenarios in Libya, at present and in the future, the 
role of the media will be crucial in framing popular understanding and respon-
ses. This in turn will influence the possible activities of those in authority, inclu-
ding political and military decisions, and efforts in support of human rights and 
any humanitarian relief responses.  
The most effective and principled roles media can take will require a high 
level understanding of professional ethics, increased journalistic and editorial 
skills, clear editorial mandates, and stable institutions. Libya’s emerging media is 
asking for support now, to give it the best chance possible to fulfil its crucial roles 
and future potential in a time of extraordinary change. 
Background 
Libya’s anti-Gaddafi uprising in February 2011 has marked differences from the 
popular protests that overthrew leaders in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt. This 
is largely due to particular features of the Gaddafi regime, and sets the context 
for both the progress of the uprising itself, and the dynamics affecting media 
within it.
gaddafi regime4
Colonel Gaddafi claimed power by military coup in 1969, overthrowing King 
Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi Sanussi in 1969. At the time of Gaddafi’s coup, the 
Libyan state was extremely young, formed only in 1951. The country’s institu-
tional heritage was weak, and Gaddafi dismantled what had existed as he sought 
to impose his own system and institute an authoritarian personality cult. The 
key feature of his rule has been to attempt to reshape the state according to his 
own personal concepts, and to suppress any dissent or debate. This has rested 
on a self-proclaimed ideology, the ‘Third Universal Theory’, ostensibly placed 
between capitalism and communism. This propagated through his ‘Green Book’, 
initially published in 1975, which expressly denounced all forms of political re-
presentation, including Parliaments, as a sham. Instead a system of local ‘Basic 
Peoples Congresses’, feeding up to a national ‘General Peoples Congress’, was 
established across the country. While the regime stated these were more truly 
democratic than representative parliaments, and would gather people’s opinions 
and recommendations from the grass roots to feed them into national decision-
making, they were instead politically controlled by regime loyalists, and often 
linked to the security apparatus. 
Commentators and analysts repeatedly note that, as a result of these proces-
ses, Gaddafi as leader is bound up with the very shape of the Libyan state more 
thoroughly than is the case for any of its Arab neighbours. With significant na-
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tional oil money, he distributed patronage and cultivated loyalty among selected 
tribal groups and personal networks; power and prestige flowed to those who 
were personally close to his leadership. Under his regime, the state and its insti-
tutions barely have an identity separate from his individual rule. 
To oppose Gaddafi in effect means to oppose the structure and institutions of 
the regime itself. To a large extent, this context is what has driven Libya’s uprising 
to quickly emerge as a civil war; it simply was not possible to replace the head of 
the state, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia, and leave the rest of the apparatus 
and leadership intact. This has set the terms for the uprising and the scale of the 
current military conflict, and is a major factor that drives the identity of the revo-
lution itself —including the current roles and practices of media within it—.
Gaddafi Media 
Ideology (especially the ideas outlined in the Green Book) and propaganda have 
been central to the Gaddafi regime’s methods. His own image was everywhere, 
on billboards and in public buildings; praise of his leadership was required in 
public documents including newspaper articles. Common stories from his rule 
relate how members of government were only referred to by their title, not their 
name, and football players were referred to only by their numbers. This aimed 
to prevent any figures from competing with his own, or his children’s, public 
prominence. He also changed the country’s national symbols, replacing the pre-
vious national flag, adopted at the time of the independence struggle from Italy, 
with an all-green banner; changing the national anthem, and in 1977 changing 
the country’s name to the ‘Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’. 
A physically expansive but tightly controlled media was part and parcel of this 
system. In its 2006 report ‘Libya: Words to Deeds’, Human Rights Watch confir-
med once again what had been long-said: “[A] review of the main newspapers, 
the state¬run television and the state-run press agency JANA... reveals a largely 
subservient and uncritical press that glorifies the government and Muammar 
al-Qaddafi. The media addresses sensitive topics like police abuse or improved 
relations with the United States only after they have been identified as accepta-
ble for debate, often by al-Qaddafi himself. Criticism of the Jamahiriya system is 
unknown”. Journalists were also imprisoned for critical views.5
Various state representatives described the media as ‘free’ because, they said, 
the revolution is of the people and the revolution owns the media, with asser-
tions that opinion can be freely expressed in People’s Congresses —a practical 
impossibility—. Space for free speech was closed. However recent satellite TV sta-
tions and to a lesser degree the spread of internet connectivity in the late 1990s 
gave many Libyans access to a wide spectrum of uncensored news.6
In recent years there were moves to gradually reform aspects of the state, 
as part of Libya’s attempts to rehabilitate its international relations. Gaddafi’s 
son Saif al-Islam was the public face of much of this process, with efforts that 
included some moves towards political reform and some reconciliation with 
opposition figures and release of prisoners;7 his Qaddafi Foundation for Inter-
national Charities was active in several areas. He also established two semi-
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62 private papers, Oea and Al-Qurnya through the Al-Ghad media group, which 
allowed some limited space for comment.8 However these relative steps towards 
openness also ran into resistance at the top; Al-Ghad was nationalised in 2009,9 
and Saif al-Islam relatively sidelined. In 2010, Freedom House rated Libya in 
the lowest group of countries not free, together with the likes of Burma, Soma-
lia, and North Korea.10 
The Libya uprising  
The Libya uprising began in earnest in February, 2011, with many saying pro-
tests in Benghazi were initially sparked by the arrest of prominent lawyer and 
human rights activist Fathi Terbil on February 15. They quickly escalated; calls 
for a large-scale ‘Day of Rage’ on February 17 circulated via online social media 
networks11 and protests took place in the eastern centre Benghazi, other eastern 
towns, and to a more limited extent in the country’s west, where security measu-
res were much tighter. Reports flowed of government crackdowns and increasing 
resistance response, including the defection of several local army personnel. Pro-
tests and security reprisals were also reported in Tripoli.12 By February 20, Human 
Rights Watch estimated 233 people had been killed, a number which quickly 
rose. By early March, the uprising was claiming control of towns up to the eas-
tern city of Brega, a short distance from Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte.
Saif Al-Islam called for dialogue in the early days of the uprising13 but also 
vowed to fight “to the last man standing,”14 warning of civil war. Crackdowns 
continued; pro-Gaddafi forces, according to numerous reports bolstered by mer-
cenaries, organised and began to attack rebel-held townships. Communications 
to the east, with infrastructure centralised in Tripoli, were cut, including inter-
net, landline, and mobile phones; during the conflict Misrata in the west also 
became similarly isolated.15 International journalists were harassed by the regime 
and its supporters, a number of them arrested; by late May five journalists were 
confirmed killed in the conflict.16
In his first speech after the uprising began, on February 22, Gaddafi described 
the rebels as ‘cockroaches’ and ‘rats’ who deserved to be executed.17 His forces 
began to re-take rebel-held cities including Brega and Ajdabya; on March 19 they 
arrived at Benghazi with heavy weapons and began entering the city. 
The advance by Gaddafi forces was only halted by air-strikes by NATO, carried 
out extremely rapidly after United Nations Resolution 1973, authorising this ac-
tion, was passed on March 17. At the time of Internews’ assessment, the frontli-
ne on the east was set between Brega and Ajdabya. In the west, after extremely 
heavy fighting that destroyed the centre of town, rebels gained control of Misrata 
in late May; fighting for towns and transport routes through the Nafusa moun-
tains has continued, with reports that rebels had gained control of the Tunisian 
border crossing of Dehiba in late April. 
The rebels centred in Benghazi established the NTC, which first met on March 
5.18 This was initially set up not as an interim government, but to explicitly ‘provi-
de an international face for the uprising’; it aims to oversee a transition to liberal 
democracy. In May an Executive Board was established, which acts as a kind of 
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government to the Council’s ostensible legislative role. However these roles so-
metimes overlap, as some NTC members have taken on somewhat executive-style 
decisions, while the Executive Board establishes its own structures and capacities. 
In the current phase, the goal of a clear separation between the legislative and exe-
cutive roles is ‘aspirational’ more than operational.19 On March 29 the NTC issued 
a ‘Vision Statement’, which serves as a general ‘road-map’ for the establishment of 
a liberal democracy in the country.20
The humanitarian effects of the conflict have been immense. As of June 19, 
OCHA records over 100,000 Libyans have left the country and not returned; 
over 260,000 nationals from neighbouring countries; and over 280,000 Third 
Country Nationals. The UNHCR estimates there are 243,000 internally displaced 
within Libya; however this number is difficult to confirm. The death toll can 
only be estimated; however by late May the NTC estimated at least fifteen thou-
sand had been killed.21
genesis of media in rebel areas: a summary  
Just a few months after the beginning of the uprising, media in rebel-held areas 
have moved forward at a rapid rate and quickly outgrown the initiatives from 
the first days of the protests. Yet the genesis of much of the current media lies in 
those early efforts. A detailed history of each initiative is beyond the scope of this 
report; given the rapid pace of events and the high level of informal participa-
tion, such a history —while fascinating— would also be challenging to compile. 
However a general summary of the major dynamics at play is still necessary, in 
order to gain an understanding of the early trajectory of media efforts in Libya’s 
rebel-controlled locations. 
Media activities have played a high-profile role in all stages of the uprising. As 
in other countries’ Arab Spring movements, protagonists repeatedly refer to the 
importance of online social media networks to share information on protests, 
crackdowns, and responses; to foster debate; and to mobilise broad participation 
in the rebellion, including circulation of the call for the ‘Day of Rage’ protests.  
This use of online forums got around the censorship and restrictions of 
state¬controlled media outlets.22 Also as elsewhere however, online wasn’t the 
only major media factor; over the past decade satellite TV has become increasin-
gly prominent, with the rise of Al Jazeera especially marking an enormous chan-
ge. Coverage of neighbouring uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia on these channels 
is commonly cited as having a galvanising effect on protestors. As the regime’s 
crackdown intensified and access to internet was cut, material gathered by do-
mestic citizen journalists was smuggled out of Libya As well as posting online, 
much was also re-broadcast back into the country via these channels,23 infor-
ming a broad national audience; this again is credited with boosting popular 
mobilisation. Ongoing coverage by international satellite TV, most of all Al Ja-
zeera, continues to have enormous domestic significance for Libyan audiences. 
This is also recognised by Gaddafi himself; in his first televised appearance after 
the protests began, he urged audiences ‘do not believe the channels owned by 
stray dogs’.24
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64 Rebellion participants quickly recognised the need to build on this somewhat 
organic interaction between different media platforms, and to connect with in-
ternational media outlets. A celebrated early initiative was pioneered by Moham-
med Nabbous, who led the set up of a series of webcams on top of the Benghazi 
courthouse to stream protests and events online as they took place, and who also 
uploaded footage gathered from around the city.25
Around this and other efforts a Media Centre quickly emerged near the 
Benghazi courthouse, which had been taken over as a centre for the rebellion. 
The Media Centre developed and operated somewhat organically, and combined 
a variety of activities and services including online production, aggregation, and 
dissemination; newspaper and newsletter production; graffiti, posters and carica-
tures; music, and more. Crucially the Centre also aimed to provide support for in-
ternational journalists as they arrived, including a translator / interpreter service, 
internet connections, and formal press registration to facilitate journalists’ travel 
and access. Many current initiatives have expanded from these early efforts; for 
example, Nabbous’ online video streaming was the genesis of the rebels’ new sa-
tellite TV, Libya al Hurra, which has since expanded, and changed location.
State media facilities were an early target as protests first began escalating; ac-
cording to Agence France Press, cited by the International Crisis Group (ICG), 
Tripoli broadcast facilities and government offices were attacked and burned as 
early as February 18.26 In other cases local media facilities were also either quickly 
targeted for takeover by those participating in the rebellion, or their existing staff 
publicly changed allegiance: staff from radio and TV stations in Benghazi, Al Bayda 
and Derna for example, pledged their commitment to the revolution and chan-
ged their programming accordingly, while state broadcast facilities and equipment 
were claimed by a mix of young, inexperienced broadcasters, sometimes together 
with experienced broadcast engineers in Misrata, Benghazi, and Tobruk, to name 
just a few.27 This mix of groups, all using previously state-owned infrastructure, 
now forms the basis of much of the terrestrial broadcast efforts in rebel-held areas.28
note on censorship
Internews discussed the possibility of censorship with many interlocutors during 
the assessment, including media practitioners, university lecturers, students, and 
officials. The strong response was that official censorship doesn’t currently play 
a role. However there were several who acknowledged that they practise some 
form of self¬censorship in the interests of the revolution. For example, while 
individual leaders on the NTC were the subject of criticism, the NTC as an insti-
tution itself was deliberately not. Some practitioners clearly said that they were 
“going easy” on the NTC because “now is not the time” —there was a “bigger 
enemy” in the form of Gaddafi and his regime. Another practitioner explained 
that he would not publish some information from an NTC source about impro-
vements in telecommunications infrastructure— in case that information turned 
out to be wrong, or unforeseen problems occurred in the infrastructure’s roll-out, 
and resulted in rumours and resentment at failures to fulfil perceived ‘promises’. 
Some in authority advocated directly for self-censorship, precisely in the interests 
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of stability (see notes under ‘Governance’ in the Media Mapping section, below). 
In all cases, these were framed as an expression of caution in support of the 
uprising, including support for the free-speech space that exists. 
However all respondents said that if the authorities tried to control them 
more, especially later in the transition, they would resist. Indeed the transitional 
institutions are so fragile that it is doubtful they could push for any restrictions 
or ‘caution’ on media content unless it came with public support; the institutions 
on their own are not strong enough to enforce an edict autonomously. Censor-
ship from authorities is not currently a concern;29 however the use of public 
pressure on minority opinions in future debates —especially if for one reason 
or another such opinions are attacked for being ‘against the revolution’— could 
become one, if a clear framework of rights for free speech, and how that would 
be implemented, is not clearly developed and articulated. 
note on propaganda 
Regime Propaganda 
Propaganda efforts were part of the Gaddafi regime’s response to the uprising and 
held true to previous methods of control, noted in more detail above. Accusa-
tions of foreign involvement led the way, as did charges that those involved in 
the fighting were being supplied with drugs. The spectre of Islamic extremism, 
including statements that Derna in the east included a base for Al Qaeda, gained 
public airing; as did predictions of an all-out tribal civil war. Intimidation was a 
major part of this propaganda effort, with one of the most direct of these being 
Gaddafi’s February 22 speech in which he declared he would hunt down the re-
bels in Benghazi ‘house by house’ and ‘alleyway by alleyway’.30
Much of this propaganda was clumsy; perhaps the most obtuse was an effort 
to convince rebel and loyalist audiences alike that Gen. Abdel Fatah Younis al-
Obeidi, a prominent military figure who had announced his defection from the 
regime a few days before, had in fact defected back in the opposite direction. 
Footage was shown of Gen. Al-Obeidi meeting Gaddafi, apparently to back this 
up —but the footage was outdated, and quickly refuted by al-Obeidi himself.31 
Several rebels said that the regime’s media efforts quickly deteriorated as the con-
flict became more intense, although this would need detailed content analysis to 
chart more accurately.
Current regime propaganda emphasises the role of NATO, and frames the 
Alliance’s role as an imperialist attack; claims of many civilians killed dominate 
the narrative. Confirmation of this is close to impossible; however international 
journalists in Tripoli have queried the level of official manipulation of the evi-
dence they are shown.32
Rebel Response 
Rebels quickly appreciated that they also needed to win the battle for media repre-
sentation and narrative. Many video and online efforts emphasise the attacks and 
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66 brutality of the regime, and then finally the stand of defiance of the rebellion itself; 
they are proclamations that define the revolution purely in terms of its opposition 
to the regime, and used this as a motivational technique, to a greater proportion 
than they express the rebellion’s future goals. These goals also existed within the 
narratives of the online and video material seen by the assessment team, but they 
were far less prominent than portrayals of regime abuses themselves.33
Insistence that this was a revolution for liberal values of human rights and 
democracy were true to the spirit of those participating; they were also clearly a 
means of countering the regime’s accusations of religious extremism and tribal 
divisions. The common refrain, ‘We are one Libya’, was a simple message empha-
sising unity across the country. However as noted by other analysts there are 
several streams in Libyan society in the east, including small, extremist religious 
groups; and tribal divisions have been thoroughly leveraged by the regime itself 
for decades, as a means to maintain power.34 The revolution does publicly call 
unequivocally for democracy and human rights, and its initial transitional struc-
tures aim in this direction. However it is a simplification to state that this is the 
only stream and the only political goal in Libyan society.35
Significant parts of the revolution’s identity, then, appear to also be formed 
specifically in response to Gaddafi’s accusations.36 This is by no means a surprise 
in a conflict —but it should not be confused with being itself a representation of 
all opinions and groups who are taking part—. Those debates and differences will 
most likely emerge when the regime falls and the transition matures. 
The revolution is a relatively informal, non-hierarchical effort; it has neither 
the ethos nor the means to centrally-control propaganda efforts. However it does 
have a strong group identity and solidarity —and this can mean that narratives 
and anecdotes that affirm this identity and the revolution’s objectives can be 
deliberately generated by small groups and take hold; or that unconfirmed sto-
ries can gain acceptance and become broadly-propagated if they match popular 
perceptions or expectations—. These stories may be related simply because they 
are believed; or as part of a deliberate effort to gain an advantage in the battle for 
media representation. For media covering the conflict, this runs the risk of beco-
ming propaganda by another, small-group-based dynamic.37
Some common stories circulating on the rebel side have these features. The ac-
cusation that Gaddafi troops have been supplied with Viagra and are using rape as 
a weapon of war38 has been extremely difficult to confirm; some are questioning 
its veracity. The high presence of mercenaries among Gaddafi forces has been 
highlighted again and again, and invokes the regime’s historical involvement in 
other conflicts in Africa. However some commentary states that this, too, has 
been harder to confirm than anticipated and merits further questioning.39 At least 
some of these stories may be true, and they are certainly believed by many on 
the rebels’ side —but the point is they have been widely disseminated as truth 
without rigorous confirmation—. Even without a cynical centrally controlled sys-
tem as the regime operates, this risks being propaganda generated by another 
means. Driven by the rebellion’s own identity, this dynamic highlights some of 
the potential risks if the principles of free media were to conflict with the political 
and military imperatives of the revolution itself. 
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generaL Trends and Issues 
Media and Transitional governance 
The NTC and related municipal councils, as explicitly transitional arrangements, 
have avoided any attempts to promulgate laws and regulations or set up ongoing 
institutions until the conflict is resolved: while a large part of the country, parti-
cularly those in Tripoli, are unable to take part in the decision-making process, 
any moves to establish apparently-permanent institutions may risk accusations 
of the east attempting to ‘take the lead’ in the revolution at the expense of those 
who are still living in areas under the regime’s control. However the longer the 
transition continues, the greater the need for institutional frameworks and sys-
tems to sustain and give direction to current efforts. This is a core dilemma affec-
ting many areas in current transitional arrangements, whether that it is health, 
finance, or education; it is also pertinent for media.  
Transitional structures are already taking shape and framing media efforts, in 
general positively, but not without ambiguity generated by this uncertain con-
text. The ‘Media Mapping’ section below outlines these structures in more detail; 
briefly, they are: 
• The Media and Communications Committee (related to the NTC as the inci-
pient national ‘legislative branch’ of the transitional administration)
• The Media Ministry (part of the incipient ‘executive branch’ of the transitional 
administration
• The Benghazi Municipal Council’s Media and Culture Department (other mu-
nicipal councils also have structures or individuals that deal with media issues, 
though many are not as formalised or consolidated as they are in Benghazi).
Both within and beyond Benghazi different and even contradictory opinions can 
be found on what approach should be taken with media now, including by those 
with significant authority. For example, the need for a media ministry is dismis-
sed outright by some, and highlighted as a requirement by others. The need for 
directly stateowned media (as distinct from an ‘arms’ length’ national broadcas-
ter model) while dismissed by most, is still advocated as a necessary measure by 
some others in authority to ensure ‘the government perspective is heard’. Com-
pletely open and unregulated media is championed by some; others espouse the 
need for some liaison, or indeed coordination, exercised by local government bo-
dies, which can include authorities ‘clarifying government expectations’ for local 
media, issuing and managing licenses for both broadcast and print, and so on.40
Within a given institutional structure, whether at national or local level, it 
is difficult to define a single tendency amongst these divergent trends; different 
individuals with significant roles in the same transitional administrative body 
have express different opinions. It may also be too early to highlight any given 
individual’s opinion as a committed agenda or position; many people are just 
now discussing what steps and models are most appropriate. Reflecting this, the 
statements of some key individuals changed during the period of the assessment 
itself, at least in part as a result of ongoing debates.41
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68 Nevertheless it is important to note that all of these opinions and tendencies are 
present, and all are informing current efforts to build up media production and tran-
sitional institutions with a media role. Given the fluidity of the transition, it may 
be that the most important features of the current situation are not contained in 
formal decisions, but rather in what informal arrangements are set up, including 
temporary administrative structures and lines of authority; the mandates for use 
of former stateowned broadcast equipment; transitional administration-linked 
support for independent media, and so on. Most of all, the nature of discussion, 
debates, and public forums on the role of media and the nature of media laws, 
ethics, and mandates is perhaps the most important indicator of which direction 
media development is likely to take in the coming period.  
There are positive signs here; for example, the NTC recently issued a press re-
lease announcing the intention to establish Libya al Hurra TV as a public service 
broadcaster along the lines of the BBC.42 Similarly, a media exhibition and series 
of workshops was recently announced on for June 19 as part of efforts to streng-
then the capacity and skills of local media.43 But by and large significant debates 
and clarifications on future directions are yet to take place. 
nTc communication strategies 
Efforts to communicate the activities and roles of the NTC have evolved rapidly 
and are crucial for citizens to be able to understand what is taking place. How 
effective this communication is has implications both for the broader political 
process, and for the development of the media sector itself. 
The NTC’s Media and Communications Committee (MCC) is the main body 
carrying out this work. Its efforts include organising press conferences and provi-
ding press releases to international and local media, maintaining online updates, 
providing initial local media training sessions, and convening public outreach 
forums. MCC initiatives to date have been positive and effective; however while 
they have made several achievements, the expansion of their work is hampered 
by a lack of resources. Several journalists, while able to communicate with rele-
vant MCC figures, also cite somewhat unclear or ineffective lines of media access 
to NTC representatives themselves. 
The Committee is headed by Mr. Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, the NTC’s official spokes-
person and its Vice-Chairman. In a strict sense his spokesperson role implies 
some degree of separation or difference from the Media Ministry, which is part 
of the Executive Board. However there is clearly an overlap in this area of work; 
the Media Minister, Mr. Shammam, arrived in Libya only towards the end of the 
assessment, and was immediately a part of liaison with international journalists, 
not an unusual dynamic given the fluidity of the transitional period. 
Institutional fluidity also has implications for other aspects of the NTC’s com-
munications approaches. For example, some of the national-level functions that 
would appear appropriate for the MCC also overlap with the Benghazi Munici-
pal Council’s Media and Culture Department, which despite being a local-level 
body also supports the nascent national broadcaster Libya al-Hurra TV, as well as 
hosting many other media initiatives. Several members of the MCC have linked 
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or overlapping roles in the Department’s media efforts, once more reflecting the 
fluidity of current transitional structures. (See the section ‘Media Mapping’ below 
for more details on institutional governance structures.) 
In addition, the lack of local media capacity means that those resources the 
MCC does provide are not always sufficiently exploited by media targeting local 
audiences, because outlets lack the personnel, skills, or equipment to use what is 
provided. It is clear that far greater information and coverage for local audiences 
could be generated if these current capacity issues were tackled (see Production 
Capacity and Gaps below for more detail).  
While some efforts are moving in the right direction, there is —as with all 
elements of the transition— a need for urgency. This is because information gaps 
on the activities of the NTC and local Municipal Councils can potentially lead to 
a vacuum in citizens’ understanding of what is taking place. Particularly in areas 
isolated from Benghazi —whether that be in Misrata in the west, Tobruk further 
east, or other areas still contested— this holds risks: a sense of isolation and slow 
progress in meeting needs on the ground, even if fully justified due to physical 
or resource limitations, can lead to local perceptions of being neglected if the 
reasons are not effectively explained and citizens’ own views heard. Any com-
munications limitations on the part of the NTC or, locally, Municipal Councils, 
can therefore hold significant implications for the political transition as a whole.
The role of NTC public communication also has a crucial, though often subtle, 
effect on the development of free media. Firstly, ready access to official positions 
is one element that can support fact-based reporting by removing one possi-
ble reason for inexperienced journalists’ resorting to rumour or unsubstantiated 
commentary. Beyond that consideration, the NTC’s Media and Communications 
Committee also has a chance to demonstrate a new model of government public 
communication, which does not rely on state ownership and control of media 
outlets themselves. 
While no one the assessment team spoke to is in favour of anything resem-
bling the Gaddafi regime’s oppressive methods of control, the view that gover-
nment needs to own its own media in order to communicate effectively was 
frequently a residual perception; in some cases there were localised efforts to set 
up early structures along these lines. This is by no means a consolidated position, 
but it is one identifiable trend that could hold future risks. One of the most effec-
tive ways of demonstrating that a state-controlled broadcaster tied to governing 
incumbents is not necessary is to demonstrate that other models also work. In 
these early days, the MCC’s role is crucial in this regard. 
Media for the revolution 
All media outlets met during this assessment identified themselves as ‘supporting 
the revolution’. This incorporated a broad range of self-defined roles and types of 
production, noted here for purposes of quick reference. They included: 
• Explicitly countering Gaddafi regime propaganda
• Urging regime soldiers to desert 
• Informing the outside world about events taking place in Libya 
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70 • Representing the voice of Libya’s youth 
• Providing a voice for the people’s opinions 
• Motivating the public to continue to support the revolution
• Informing the public about the decisions of the NTC and local councils
• Educating audiences about political processes, for example the role of a 
constitution
• Criticising individual members of transitional governing structures (but not 
those transitional institutions themselves) 
• Recognising and honouring those killed in the fighting, and their families 
• Religious material 
• Urging former Gaddafi supporters to join the revolution 
• Promoting the voice of particular groups in society, including women 
• Telling stories of the human impact of the conflict, and human interest sto-
ries (typically described as ‘humanitarian’ coverage) 
• Promoting and informing the public about new civil society initiatives 
Media Production capacity: gaps and needs 
Media in rebel-held areas have made extraordinary gains in a very limited period 
of time. Nevertheless many interlocutors spoke of the need to increase capacity 
with training and institutional assistance, whether through workshops and clas-
ses, mentorships, assistance in institutional development, or via relationships 
with broadcast and journalism institutions internationally.
Limitations in media capacity take many forms. At the simplest level Gaddafi-
regime suppression seriously restricted the chances for journalists, editors, and 
students to develop critical and in some areas practical skills. While senior or 
experienced former media workers do have important skills, a number stated the 
need for further support and training, and the great majority of young journalists 
have received little to no training at all.  
Resources are another limitation on capacity. Libya differs from many other 
transitional contexts in that in many areas there is a good level of basic resour-
ces, including production equipment, studios, broadcast infrastructure, some 
printers in Benghazi, and so on. However in some areas this infrastructure has 
been destroyed; in others, although resources exist, they are not sufficient for the 
level of production required. Part of this is due to the general economic situation 
—financial liquidity is limited and imports restricted, creating blockages in pro-
curement of needed equipment—. The destruction of infrastructure and the lack 
of resources are greatest outside of Benghazi. For example all large and medium-
scale printers were reportedly destroyed in Misrata, while they never existed in 
smaller eastern towns; in both cases printed material can only either be produced 
on small, personal printers, or sent to Benghazi for production. 
Damage to or restrictions on internet and telephone infrastructure itself is 
another major issue. Libya’s internet access was routed through Tripoli and cut 
off when the conflict started in earnest; key mobile phone infrastructure was 
also based in the capital. While efforts to re-establish internet services are con-
tinuing apace, currently isolated VSAT connections are the only option; some 
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towns have only a couple of connections. Mobile phone telephony has been 
re-established in the east but with restrictions, including no text messaging or 
international calls, all of which impacts on journalists’ ability to work. 
The lack of a normal, functioning economy is also limiting capacity in other 
ways: all participants in media, from journalists to editors and producers to ad-
ministrators, define themselves as ‘volunteers’; they draw no direct salary for 
their efforts. While in general the commitment and effort displayed is admirable, 
in at least some important cases this means that attendance can be haphazard, 
negatively affecting production schedules and consistency of programming. The 
need for funds to pay staff was often cited as a concern; it is unlikely that this 
can be solved on any significant scale before the economy itself becomes opera-
tional, which means the longer the current situation continues, the greater this 
challenge will become. 
Production systems are another limitation. A notable example is coverage of 
the NTC itself: while many media outlet staff have personal links with adminis-
tration figures, systematic production methods to ensure fast, comprehensive 
coverage is often lacking. This can range from outlets simply lacking telephones 
with which to call NTC figures, or internet through which they can receive press 
releases. However it also often includes a lack of strategy in coverage, for example 
few daily broadcast slots to give updates on administration decisions, or only one 
or no journalists assigned to regularly cover transitional administration issues. 
(In some cases this is countered by close direct involvement of administration 
representatives in direct production, itself a potential issue for the separation 
of state and media.) This lack of a systematic approach to production can only 
result in information gaps for audiences. 
A final limitation in capacity is reach. The bulk of media production takes 
place in Benghazi, although all other locations visited had local radio produc-
tion (with the exception of Ajdabya). While there is a surfeit of newspapers in 
the city, few if any are distributed further afield. Other towns in the east have 
only a handful of new publications —not necessarily a limitation of information 
access for audiences of itself, as two well-run, widely-circulated newspapers can 
provide coverage for a large population; but it is a demonstration of the different 
dynamics and scales at work across locations. There are some positive efforts 
to counter limitations in reach (for example material is shared between radio 
stations in different eastern towns), but limitations on media access outside of 
Benghazi is striking. 
More concerning is that there are few outlets that can cover the whole coun-
try, including conflict areas and areas under Gaddafi control. AM stations in 
Benghazi and Misrata have national coverage —but they have many serious limi-
tations in their own production capacity—. Two satellite TV channels can theo-
retically cover the country; one, however, is on a satellite not generally accessed 
by Libyan audiences, and the other is currently limited to two hours of program 
production. This means that there is little opportunity for Libyans outside rebel-
held areas to get information about what is happening, particularly regarding the 
transitional administration itself. External satellite channels such as Al Jazeera 
and Al Arabiya are the only available source for such audiences; however while 
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72 the coverage on these channels is extensive, it is targeted to regional, not natio-
nal, audiences and so is aiming to fulfil different information needs. 
Media Across Generations 
The statement that ‘youth made this revolution’ is a frequent one; and media 
by and for youth is very prominent. This is far more notable in Benghazi, which 
as of mid-June had around 60 registered newspapers and magazines, a large pro-
portion of those run by young people. Several other efforts —including online 
production, graffiti, and others— also feature a high proportion of young parti-
cipants. However while there is still meaningful youth participation outside of 
Benghazi, including several youth groups in Misrata, it is far less predominant, 
with apparently a higher proportion of more senior figures involved in and dri-
ving media production. 
Electronic broadcast media, which relies on greater infrastructure including stu-
dios, transmitters, and recording equipment, has proportionally much greater par-
ticipation by the older generation. Many are former staff of state institutions whe-
re the necessary equipment was located, and who have now joined the uprising’s 
effort. This is not an exclusive division —there are at least two radio initiatives 
in Benghazi run by youth, and young people participate alongside senior staff in 
several efforts—. Nevertheless the character of different media efforts run ‘by’ or 
‘for’ youth, and others in which young people are part of the staff, is distinctive. 
Media and Business Investment 
Future trends in media are certain to have large involvement of Libyan business 
interests, both at home and throughout the Diaspora, and from other donors 
and supporters. Already one private satellite TV station, Libya Lekon Alahrar, has 
been established with assistance from Qatar,44 and Libya al-Hurra in Benghazi. At 
the time of the assessment another had begun broadcasting a test-signal, with 
rumours of a fourth starting soon. 
Previous transitions, ranging from the former Soviet Union to Indonesia to 
Pakistan and others, have been accompanied by large-scale investment and a pro-
liferation of well-funded, but initially under-skilled, media outlets. The wealth, 
in Libya itself, throughout the Libyan Diaspora, and among other supporters 
of the rebels, means that it is likely that similar dynamics will emerge. This is 
perhaps most likely to take place in satellite TV, which is already well established 
among Libyan audiences. The skilllevels among Libyan journalists are currently 
under-prepared for such a change. 
Media and Civil Society Debates 
New civil society organisations —focusing on relief efforts, on youth, and several 
other issues— are emerging at a rapid rate in especially Benghazi. Yet this nascent 
civil society sector is at a very early stage and participants are just beginning to 
define their areas of focus, mandates, and key issues.  
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There are as yet no civil society organisations with a particular focus on media 
freedom and freedom of expression; no key advocates or ‘media champions’ have so far 
emerged. There are a number of civil society organisations who combine media 
production with relief or social development activities, but none who are expli-
citly positioned to focus on raising media advocacy issues or promoting discus-
sion of media freedoms and appropriate laws. At least one journalist union is on 
the way to becoming established, but still has a long way to go to consolidate 
and develop its program (see the ‘Media Mapping’ section below). 
Again, this is understandable given the early stage of developments; and the 
fact that enthusiasm for the values of free speech is universally proclaimed may 
create the impression that this is not a crucial priority precisely because at this 
point it appears to be uncontested. Yet as the observations above make clear, even 
at this early stage debate would benefit from a greater variety of input and exper-
tise. The MCC is taking some initiatives in this direction, for example organising 
an exhibition and workshops for local media on June 19; the Executive Board’s 
recently established Ministry for Culture and Community45 is also working on an 
extensive training and support program for emerging civil society groups. 
While the affirmation of the values of free expression and free media are hear-
tening, the potential for some patterns to be established early, and for possible 
misunderstandings or mis-steps to take place, means that greater informed deba-
te on this key element of the revolution is itself a definite need. 
naTIonaL PoLITIcaL and MILITary Issues: IMPLIcaTIons 
for MedIa
Many core issues that affect the nascent media sector also have impact on the 
conflict and transition as a whole. While these concerns are extremely broad, it is 
nevertheless important to note how they may affect the media sector specifically; 
and in the opposite direction, how the media may well affect the dynamic of the 
conflict and transition’s overall development in turn.  
Tripoli and the conflict end-game 
When and how Tripoli falls will have far-reaching implications for all elements of 
the transition. Although Benghazi is the second-largest city in Libya, the east as 
a whole comprises only about one-third of the country’s population. It is not the 
centre of political power, infrastructure, or business. The rebels unanimously sta-
te that Tripoli will be their capital, yet Tripoli remains under the Gaddafi regime’s 
control and its citizens, including likely opposition leaders, have not been able 
to play any significant role in the transitional process to date, and will need to 
be incorporated into future decisions and directions. The NTC is highly aware of 
the need to remain open to this process. Yet at this stage whatever dynamic that 
may emerge is an unknown factor. 
This is not to question the purpose or of current transitional arrangements; 
current leaders are highly cognisant of the need to maintain an open process and 
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figures from much of the country are unable to take part. But it would be a mis-
take to simply assume that the understandings and trajectories currently set will 
remain unchanged, given the large-scale transformations that are still to come.
  
Media Implications
Media in rebel-held areas have a potentially powerful role to inform citizens in 
Tripoli and elsewhere about what is taking place across the country, and commu-
nicating the nature of the transitional process. This can be as simple as stating the 
facts on the ground, which in large part would counter Gaddafi-controlled media 
propaganda; if done well, it can potentially serve as a strong grass-roots ‘confidence-
building’ measure, not just in the transition itself, but in the media values that it 
supports. However if the response is with overt propaganda of their own —ignoring 
the nuances and unknowns of the current situation— that may have an impact 
on the level of confidence citizens, particularly any grass-roots Gaddafi supporters, 
have in the transitional process. In either case, the current lack of resources and 
capacity of media with national reach is a big obstacle to either of these approaches. 
At the level of governance and policy, whether a transitional administration 
that incorporates representatives from all of Libya will agree with every initiative 
undertaken so far is an unanswered question. For example, the already-stated 
model for turning Libya al-Hurra into a national broadcaster, while a positive 
step itself, may be up for dispute; others may want a stronger role in running 
that broadcaster. Other models and ideas of media-related laws and regulation 
currently not present or may also be placed on the table. Positive debates and 
examples of practice, rather than set institutions and pre-defined positions 
within them, is potentially the best preparation at this stage for what could be a 
significantly altered transitional process.
Transition vs. stasis 
As noted above, transitional leaders may be very aware of the political impera-
tive to keep the current process as flexible and adaptable as they can. Yet it is 
also impossible to keep all decisions on-hold. Communities in rebel-held areas 
understand that the war is still being fought; nevertheless they will expect to see 
some progress —and at the very least, are unlikely to welcome any deterioration 
in basic services and goods. This means that institutional frameworks, previously 
centralised in Tripoli, will need to be established and consolidated to maintain 
current stability. The uprising to date has been remarkable, perhaps unpreceden-
ted, in the degree to which it has been spontaneous and unstructured. Yet in 
order to maintain clarity of vision and purpose, levels of security, and common 
services, an increasingly explicit political leadership with the binding decisions 
that this entails will become more urgent. 
These are steps that international supporters of the NTC are pressing for; 
however the conflicting demands between transitional openness and institutio-
nal consolidation that they require constitutes a real challenge for the NTC. How 
the Council negotiates its way through and achieves balance between these di-
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fferent imperatives, and especially how long the conflict continues and requires 
them to do this, will be a significant factor in the political process.
Media Implications
If the transition and its attendant pressures do stretch out and frustrations build, 
this will be an early test of new media outlets’ coverage: how much will this co-
verage investigate and explain the underlying causes of the issues at hand, and 
explore solutions; and how much will it potentially amplify —or ignore— the 
frustrations of specific groups? 
Whether outlets have the skills, equipment, or even funds to do this would 
be tested. Governance issues will also become more challenging, as temporary 
administrative arrangements almost inevitably become more consolidated, in-
cluding the positions of those in authority, and the practices that have so far 
emerged on an ad-hoc basis. 
Humanitarian needs: Transition vs. crisis 
There is a major humanitarian crisis in areas where the conflict is taking place; 
and several crises where citizens and migrant workers have fled across Libya’s 
borders. However international and national humanitarian organisations say re-
bel-held areas where conflict has ceased are themselves not undergoing a large-
scale humanitarian crisis. The high organisational capacity and available resour-
ces in these areas mean that as soon as the firing stops, the significant crises in 
places of conflict rapidly become situations of recovery and political transition. 
(This is notwithstanding some pressing requirements, such as ongoing medical 
needs for the wounded and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) risk awareness and 
clearance, and protection issues, to name some of the most prominent.) 
However this will not necessarily remain the case. Awareness of what is taking 
place in the country’s south is low —those leading the NTC’s own relief efforts des-
cribed it as a ‘black box’ about which they have little to no information. An exten-
ded siege or long, bloody conflict for Tripoli could result in significant degradation 
and / or damage to infrastructure and supplies in the capital as well as immense 
suffering. How quickly Gaddafi falls could very likely result in much larger-scale, 
longer-term urgent humanitarian needs.  
Little planning has gone into communications preparation for these scenarios 
on the part of national and international humanitarian organisations. Preparedness 
is needed for this possibility; communication capacity to current and potentially 
affected populations is an essential part of this. 
Media Implications
There is no comprehensive humanitarian communication strategy on the part of 
national or international organisations that targets audiences both within and 
beyond rebel-held areas. While some media currently have a humanitarian focus, 
this is usually limited to covering human-interest stories; awareness of the nature 
and rationale of humanitarian mandates is low. A communication strategy that 
includes training of media personnel in these issues can potentially enhance 
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76 understanding of the issues involved. If such programming is carried on outlets 
with national reach, it can also serve as another form of confidence-building and 
awareness-raising at the grass-roots level in Gaddafi-held areas of how to access 
support to meet humanitarian needs over the short or longer-term.
security
The rebellion has been a spontaneous, popular uprising; there was no process 
of slowly developing and arming established rebel groups. This means there are 
only relatively limited structures or lines of communication or command for 
those bearing arms; both the rebel armed forces and its internal security, like 
everything else, depends to a large degree on informal co-operation.  
There are reportedly somewhere between 11 to 40 volunteer armed groups in 
Benghazi alone, with some accused of abuses and carrying out arbitrary deten-
tions,46 and a significant amount of weaponry visible on the streets, including 
automatic rifles, machine guns mounted on pickup trucks, rocket-propelled gre-
nades and more, seized from regime stockpiles or sourced from elsewhere. Initial 
efforts are underway to consolidate these groups into a more formalised structure, 
but this is an unavoidably complex area. Despite these concerns, this situation has 
not drastically affected Benghazi’s safety so far, but the use of weapons to resolve 
personal disputes is frequently mentioned by residents as a key concern. If divi-
sions between political or social groups, or armed groups themselves, emerge in 
the future this has the potential to become a serious and destabilising challenge.47
Several commentators also point to perceived divisions amongst the transitio-
nal leadership, and say this could also become a cause for future instability with 
potentially serious consequences.48 (The assassination of military leader General 
Abdel Fattah Younes and the speculation surrounding his death is a demonstration 
of the possibility of violent incidents affecting internal security in rebel areas.)49
Media Implications
In any deterioration of security environments, journalists and media outlets are 
often among the first to feel the increased physical threat and pressure to change 
coverage; if conditions were to become worse in rebel-held areas, a similar dyna-
mic would emerge. Engaged, accurate, and quality coverage by media of this is-
sue, on the other hand, can be one influence promoting public pressure to resol-
ve these difficulties, including engaging audiences in armed groups themselves.
Tribal and religious Identities 
The Gaddafi regime from the beginning warned of dire consequences flowing 
from the rebellion, including tribal civil war, and the rise of religious extremism. 
Prominent figures in the rebellion dismissed this, insisting that they aimed for a 
liberal rights based democracy. 
There is currently little indication of tribal or religious extremist agendas 
holding strong influence in the direction of the uprising. However as outlined 
earlier, analysts familiar with Libya note that Gaddafi himself relied on tribal di-
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visions as one of his strategies for maintaining power; and efforts by rebel leader-
ship to win over significant tribal groups —and other meetings held by Gaddafi 
in Tripoli— indicate that this is an important factor.50
Islam is extremely important to the identity of Libyan communities, and 
tends to be more conservative in the east of the country. While much of this is 
moderate, analysts also point to a history of small-scale extremist Islamic resis-
tance to the regime in the east, with some generated from Libyan participants in 
the Afghan war against the Soviet Union.51
In the face of this background, an exclusive insistence on a liberal, indivi-
dualist, democratic identity for the revolution, while not false, appears an over-
simplification of the groups involved in the conflict who may not yet have deve-
loped or articulated their positions.  
Media Implications
There are clearly a number of debates and discussions that need to take place, 
bringing in different tribal and religious perspectives; this is more challenging 
and nuanced than voicing demands for rights and providing a platform for the 
voices of youth, for example; or including significant space for religion in pro-
duction, which a number of outlets do. Some insist it is too early, and potentially 
destabilising to do this now.  
Arguably they may have a point, depending on how it is carried out. The ques-
tion is, at what moment could it become too late, with its own destabilising po-
tential? This can’t be answered yet. However, if media outlets are able to reflect 
and encompass these issues, they could strengthen the quality of debate; if they 
are unable to do so, there is a possibility of greater fragmentation along the lines of 
different interest groups down the track.
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